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Abstract 
This paper explores the relation between corporate governance mechanisms in Japan and the 
costs of public debt financing. Using a sample of Japanese corporate bond issues during the 
period 2005-2008, we find that CEO ownership is associated with higher yield spreads after 
controlling for firm- and bond-specific characteristics. Founding family ownership is also 
positively related to yield spreads. In contrast, firms with large corporate shareholders enjoy 
lower yield spreads. These results are robust to various alternative specifications. Overall, our 
results indicate that corporate governance mechanisms in Japan are important factors affecting 
the costs of public debt financing. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Investors are generally concerned about whether they will certainly get some returns on their 
investments. The main purpose of corporate governance systems is then to provide investors with an 
assurance that they will be distributed some profits as these returns (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Thus, 
investors have a great interest in the type of corporate governance system in firms with which they 
invest. For instance, if corporate governance systems that protect investor’s interests dominate, then 
investors is likely to obtain their returns, and these firms will enjoy lower costs of external financing. 
In contrast, when corporate governance systems that generate the agency conflicts with investors 
prevail, then the required returns on investments are not likely to materialize, and these firms will face 
higher costs of external financing. Thus, the quality of the corporate governance system has a 
significant effect on the ability of firms to raise external finance.  
It is often argued that shareholder’s interests do not fully align with those of bondholders. For 
example, shareholders could expropriate wealth from bondholders by investing in riskier projects, and 
then reap most gains if the projects perform well, while bondholders bear most of the costs (the asset 
substitution problem) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Such a divergence of interests between 
shareholders and bondholders becomes severe when controlling shareholders have an incentive to 
pursuit self-serving activities. Controlling shareholders then tend to entrench themselves at the 
expense of other investors, and then enjoy the private benefits of control, thereby leading to a 
reduction in firm value. Moreover, these activities include risk-taking and wealth transfer activities 
that are detrimental to bondholder. Thus, these incentives could potentially exacerbate the 
shareholder-bondholder conflict and generate an increase in potential default risk. Recognizing the 
agency conflicts with controlling shareholders, bondholders will require higher yields for these firms. 
However, controlling shareholders often bring benefits to bondholders. Controlling shareholders have 
an incentive to monitor, discipline, and even oust incumbent managers. These monitoring activities 
serve to curb managerial discretion, and then enhance firm value. Consequently, monitoring activities 
potentially mitigate the shareholder-bondholder conflict, and thus lower potential default risk. 
Bondholders reflect such benefits in bond yields, and so permit the firms to enjoy lower yields.
1
 
In this paper, we examine the relation between corporate governance mechanisms in Japan and 
the costs of public debt financing. Using a sample of 640 corporate bond issues on 196 firms during 
the period 2005-2008, our empirical analysis reveals that CEO ownership is positively associated with 
yield spreads after controlling for firm- and bond-specific characteristics. This suggests that 
bondholders are concerned about conflict of interests with the CEO, and correspondingly require 
                                                   
1
 For an extensive survey on the role of controlling shareholders in agency conflicts within firms, see 
Denis and McConnell (2003), and Shleifer and Vishny (1997). 
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higher yields for the bond issues of these firms. In addition, we find that family ownership is 
positively correlated with higher bond yields. This indicates that family firms face higher costs of 
public debt financing because of concerns about the agency conflicts with family members. Finally, 
firms with large corporate shareholders have lower yield spreads. This could be interpreted as 
evidence that monitoring activities by large corporate shareholders enable the firms to enjoy lower 
costs of public debt financing. 
In addition, we present some other interesting results. First, we consider whether managerial 
ownership affects the costs of public debt financing. Consistent with the results above, managerial 
ownership is positively related to yield spreads, suggesting that managerial ownership is viewed 
negatively in the bond markets. Second, we construct five family firm-related variables. In particular, 
when the firm founder serves as president or chairperson and family members are among the top ten 
shareholders, these family firms face higher yield spreads. This indicates that the costs of public debt 
financing vary with the type of family firm. Finally, a larger share of directors from large corporate 
shareholders is related to lower yield spreads. This shows that monitoring activities are considered 
favorably by bondholders. 
To check the robustness of our results, we test various regressions models. Our main results are 
robust to alternative specifications with respect to the type of security firms serving as bond 
underwriters, inclusion of financial institution ownership, sample selection, nonlinearities in credit 
rating and leverage, adjusted credit rating variable, and endogeneity concerns. Overall, our findings 
show that corporate governance systems in Japan are essential factors influencing the costs of public 
debt financing and then these impacts change with the characteristics of the corporate governance 
system. 
This study is related to other works on the impacts of corporate governance systems on the costs 
of public debt financing. Anderson et al. (2003) examine the effect of family ownership on the costs of 
public debt financing, and show that family ownership is associated with lower yield spreads. Bhojraj 
and Sengupta (2003) document that institutional ownership has an adverse impact on yield spreads, 
while a higher share of outside directors has a favorable effect on yield spreads. Cremers et al. (2007) 
explore the relation between shareholder control as internal governance and takeover defenses as 
external governance, and provide evidence that the impact of shareholder control on yield spreads 
varies with takeover vulnerability. In examination of the relation between corporate governance and 
the costs of public debt financing, earlier studies also adopt the antitakeover provisions index 
constructed by Gompers et al. (2003). Klock et al. (2005) provide evidence that antitakeover 
provisions lower the costs of public debt financing, and so conclude that antitakeover provisions are 
viewed positively by bondholders. Chava et al. (2009) investigate the relation between the 
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antitakeover provisions index and the costs of bank loans. They find that firms with higher takeover 
vulnerability are required to pay higher spreads on bank loans. However, these studies are limited to 
corporate governance systems in the United States. We then require further investigations of the 
linkages between ownership structures and the costs of public debt financing in other countries, 
including Japan. 
This paper makes two contributions to existing literatures. First, we provide first evidence that 
corporate governance mechanisms in Japan have substantial impacts on the costs of public debt 
financing. Japanese firms mainly use bank loans for raising funds, and analyses in previous studies are 
largely limited to examination of the relation between corporate governance by banks and easy access 
to banks loans (e.g., Hoshi et al., 1991).
2
 Moreover, of the works investigating the determinants of 
yield spreads in Japanese corporate bond market, corporate governance structures that could affect 
yield spreads have been not explored (see, e.g., Nakashima and Saito, 2009; Takaoka and McKenzie, 
2006; Shirasu and Yonezawa, 2008). Second, our results suggest that bondholders have different 
concerns about governance mechanisms in Japan by focusing on governance structures that receive 
less attention in previous literatures. For CEO ownership, earlier works ignore the linkage between 
CEO ownership and the costs of public debt financing. For family-owned firms, the analysis of family 
firms in Japan is primarily rare.
3
 For non-financial firms as shareholders, extant empirical literatures 
mainly place emphasis on the relation between ownership level and firm performance (e.g., Miyajima 
and Kuroki, 2007; Morck et al., 2000), and therefore focus less on the relation between ownership 
level and the costs of public debt financing. In addition, previous papers consider the large institutional 
shareholders that have no special relationship with firms other than ownership (Anderson et al., 2003; 
Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Cremers et al., 2007). In contrast, Japanese non-financial firms as large 
shareholders maintain long-term relationship with firms apart from ownership.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides explanations with 
characteristics of our data sample, the construction of the variables, and descriptive statistics. Section 
3 provides the basic results, and Section 4 shows some additional results. Section 5 tests the robustness 
of our results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data, variables, and descriptive statistics 
 
In our analyses, we use a sample of at-issue straight bond issues during the period 2005-2008, 
                                                   
2
 The agency problems between shareholders and debtholders in Japan are explored in Prowse (1990) that 
documents that concentrated ownership by Japanese financial institutions as debtholders helps mitigate the 
agency problems. 
3
 The extant literatures on family firms in Japan include Nguyen (2011) and Saito (2008). 
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published by the Japan Securities Dealers Association. This dataset, among other things, includes 
information about bond yields, amounts, maturities, and ratings. The bond issue data is merged with 
information on corporate governance measures, and financial information. Our sample is restricted to 
bond issues with fixed rate. We exclude from the sample firms in the finance industry, and regulated 
industries such as electric and gas. In particular, our sample does not include the data for Japan 
Railway Group, and Japan Tobacco Inc. because these firms were managed previously by the 
government, and even now continue to maintain close relationship with the government. We also 
remove unlisted firms and investment trusts because financial information is not available. After 
merging the datasets and excluding unnecessary observations, the resulting sample covers 640 
firm-year observations on 196 firms. 
 
2.1. Yield spreads 
 
Our dependent variable, Spread, is calculated as the at-issue yield to maturity on straight bonds 
in excess of the yield to maturity on government bonds with the closest maturity as a benchmark. 
Information on government bonds come from the Japan Securities Dealers Association. 
 
2.2. Corporate governance variables 
 
For governance measures, we use three key corporate governance variables: CEO ownership, 
family ownership, and corporate ownership. These corporate governance variables are calculated at 
the fiscal year-end prior to the bond issue. 
 
2.2.1. CEO ownership 
 
As suggested by Berle and Means (1932), when managers have little equity in the firms, and 
shareholders are widely dispersed, managers have less incentive to pursue value-maximization 
objectives. Instead, they tend to adopt investment and financing policies that benefit themselves at the 
expense of shareholders. Self-serving activities include opportunistic behavior, job protection, and the 
allocation of investor’s funds for personal benefits as non-value-maximizing activities. In such a 
situation, the manager’s interests are not coincident with those of the firm’s shareholders. 
However, when managerial ownership rises, manager’s incentive to pursue 
non-value-maximizing objectives declines because managers with equity need to incur costs 
associated with self-serving activities. In its place, managers have an incentive to enhance the market 
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value of the firm. As such, alignment of the manager’s interests with those of shareholders results in a 
reduction in the potential divergence of interests between managers and shareholders (Morck et al., 
1988).
4
 Furthermore, the reduction in managerial discretion benefits bondholders because manager’s 
self-interested activities that harm bondholders decline. As a consequence, interests of managers as 
shareholders become closer to those of bondholders, and the likelihood of default risk is lower. Overall, 
if bondholders perceive managerial ownership as lowering the likelihood of default, they allow these 
firms to issue debt with lower yields.  
However, there are costs associated with higher managerial ownership because higher 
ownership provides managers with an incentive to entrench themselves against other corporate 
governance mechanisms. Entrenched managers could then again indulge their preferences for 
non-value-maximizing objectives (Morck et al., 1988). Moreover, self-serving activities harm 
bondholders. In such a situation, the bondholder-shareholder conflict is exacerbated, and default risk 
potentially increases. If bondholders predict such managerial incentives, they demand higher returns 
from these firms. 
We examine the impact of ownership held by managers on the costs of public debt financing by 
using the variable for the fraction of equity held by the CEO (CEO ownership). CEOs are generally 
powerful figures on board, and have the ability to exercise great power over management decisions. 
Thus, if CEO ownership is considered positively in the bond markets, the coefficient on CEO 
ownership is expected to be negative. On the other hand, if CEO ownership is considered unfavorably 
in the bond markets, the coefficient on CEO ownership is expected to be positive. Because there is no 
theoretically strong a priori reason to favor one effect over the other, the effect of CEO ownership on 
yield spreads is an empirical issue. We often face the difficulty in identifying the CEO on board. For 
many of our sample firms, either the chairperson (Kaicho) or president (Shacho) is typically the CEO. 
However, in other firms, we sometimes obtain no clear information about CEO, and so we assume that 
the president (Shacho) on the board is the CEO.
5
 Identification of CEO on board and data on 
ownership level held by CEO come from the Yakuin Shikiho published by Toyo Keizai Shinposha and 
the Yuka Shoken Houkokusho.  
In addition to CEO ownership, we use the fraction of equity held by the managers (Managerial 
ownership). While CEO ownership captures the effect of CEO incentive on yields, Managerial 
                                                   
4
 Some studies argue that alignment of manager’s interests with shareholder’s those could harm 
bondholders by encouraging managers to invest in riskier activities (Bagnani et al., 1994; Ortiz-Molina, 
2006).  However, because bondholders receive benefits from the decrease in managerial discretion, these 
alignment effects do not always have an adverse impact on bondholders. 
5
 Chairperson often exerts powerful influence on firm management. For this reason, Kubo and Saito (2009), 
and Saito (2008) use information about the sum of equity held by both president and chairperson. However, 
we are unable to do this because our sample includes firms with committee systems that have no 
chairperson in an executive position. 
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ownership are included to control for the effects of all manager’s incentives. 
 
2.2.2. Family ownership 
 
Founding family firms are prevalent among public firms around the world.
6
 Unlike other 
shareholders, families have an unique incentive to manage their firms. In particular, they have an 
interest in both the firm’s long-term survival, and their family’s own reputation. These could 
potentially affect the shareholder-bondholder conflict. First, families have a strong impetus to keep the 
firm survive, and to pass the firm to other family members or their descendants. Thus, families seek to 
manage the firm for survival by maximizing firm value rather than shareholder value. Because 
bondholders benefit from higher firm value, this incentive unique to family firms could help mitigate 
the shareholder-bondholder conflict. Second, families are concerned about their family’s reputation 
held by external parties. Family firms generally experience infrequent turnover of managers and 
directors. This long-term board presence keeps relationship with external parties sustainable. More 
importantly, long-term relationship established through family reputation is also desirable for 
bondholders because families continue to maintain firm performance in the long run (Anderson et al., 
2003).
7
  
As discussed earlier, when families are major shareholders, they have an incentive to monitor 
and discipline management, thereby enhancing firm performance. These monitoring activities benefit 
bondholders, and so help mitigate the shareholder-bondholder conflict, thereby resulting in lower 
default risk. Taken together, if family-owned firms are viewed as lowering default risk in the bond 
markets, family-owned firms enjoy lower costs of public debt financing (Anderson et al., 2003).  
However, family firms could also extract the private benefits of control at the expense of other 
investors, including bondholders. This could aggravate the shareholder-bondholder conflict, thereby 
leading to an increase in default risk. When family-owned firms are viewed as raising default risk by 
bondholders, they have higher costs of public debt financing.  
Unfortunately, we have no comprehensive data source on family firms, and face the difficulty in 
obtaining reliable data on these firms. Accordingly, we attempt to gather manually information on 
family firms from several data sources. First, we identify the firm founder, using the Nihon Kaishashi 
Souran published by Toyo Keizai Shinposha, and the Yuka Shoken Houkokusho. If we are unable to 
identify the firm founder, we consider the firms as those without founders, e.g., firms founded by other 
firms. Second, we obtain information on the founder’s descendants, including distant relatives or 
in-laws with different last names using the Nikkei Telecom 21 and the Yuka Shoken Houkokusho. 
                                                   
6
 Saito (2008) documents that family firms are relatively common in Japan. 
7
 For a more detailed discussion, see Anderson et al. (2003). 
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Finally, we seek to collect information about equity ownership related to family members. 
Family-member related ownership includes not only equity held directly by family members, but 
family member-related holding companies or foundations.  
We attempt to obtain information on family member-related ownership, but have the difficulty 
in accurately collecting the data. Following Anderson et al. (2003), we construct a ownership-based 
binary variable (Family ownership) that has a value of 1 if family members, and the affiliated firms are 
among the top ten shareholders, and 0 otherwise (50 firm-year observations on 28 firms). This 
definition differs from that in Saito (2008) in that in identifying family firms, we do not use 
information about the family members on board. If family firms enjoy lower yields, the coefficient on 
Family ownership is expected to be negative. In contrast, if family firms face higher yields, the 
coefficient on Family ownership is expected to be positive. However, we have no a priori reasoning to 
underpin the exact effect of ownership held by family members on yield spreads. Ultimately, the 
question of the effect of family ownership on yield spreads is an empirical issue.  
In addition, existing studies document that the characteristics of the CEO, management, and 
ownership in family firms have different effects on firm performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Mork et al., 1988; Saito, 2008; Villalonga and Amit, 2006), and the costs of public debt financing 
(Anderson et al., 2003). To capture these impacts, we use five dummy variables for family firms: 
Founder ownership is a variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm founder serves as president or 
chairperson, and family members are among the top ten shareholders, and 0 otherwise (26 firm-year 
observations on 13 firms). Founder management is a variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm 
founder serves as president or chairperson, and family members are not among the top ten 
shareholders, and 0 otherwise (3 firm-year observations on 1 firms). Descendant ownership is a 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the founder’s descendants serve as president or chairperson, and 
family members are among the top ten shareholders, and 0 otherwise (15 firm-year observations on 10 
firms). Descendant management is a variable that takes a value of 1 if the founder’s descendants serve 
as president or chairperson, and family members are not among the top ten shareholders, and 0 
otherwise (18 firm-year observations on 9 firms). Outsider management is a variable that takes a value 
of 1 if outsider hired by family members serves as president or chairperson, and family members are 
not among the top ten shareholders, and 0 otherwise (9 firm-year observations on 6 firms). The exact 
effects of these five dummy variables on yield spreads are also empirical issues. 
 
2.2.3. Corporate ownership 
 
Large shareholders have an incentive to gather information about the firms they partly own, and 
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so monitor the incumbent mangers of these firms. Furthermore, they exert control over firm 
management to have their interests respected. These monitoring activities decrease managerial 
discretion. This suggests that the interests of outside shareholders are closely aligned with those of 
bondholders that suffer from managerial discretion. Consequently, this alignment could help mitigate 
bondholder-shareholder divergence, and lower default risk. Furthermore, large shareholders that 
typically invest in the firms over longer periods have an incentive to alleviate the potential agency 
conflicts with bondholders to repeatedly access the funds in the debt markets (Anderson et al., 2003). 
Anticipating the benefits from such activities, bondholders require lower yields for the firm’s debt 
(Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Denis and McConnell, 2003). Conversely, outside large shareholders 
could also exercise undue influence over management to enjoy the private benefits of control (see, e.g., 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Such incentives could exacerbate the shareholder-bondholder conflict, 
thereby leading to an increase in potential default risk. Recognizing this, bondholders require higher 
yields for the firms in which such controlling shareholders dominate. 
We focus on non-financial firms among the firm’s outside shareholders. In Japan, non-financial 
firms as the largest shareholders have a long-term relationship with the owned firms through repeated 
business transactions. In turn, vertical business linkages between subcontracting and parent firms often 
characterize the relationship between owned firms and corporate sharehoders. We define corporate 
shareholders as those with more than 10 % shareholdings, and use the proportion of equity held by 
corporate shareholders (Corporate ownership) to capture the effect of ownership level by corporate 
shareholders on the costs of public debt financing. Furthermore, when firm performances declines, 
corporate shareholders could put pressure on management, and even replace incumbent managers by 
appointing their employees as new directors to the board. Thus, the presence of directors from 
corporate shareholders on the board indicates that corporate shareholders intervene in the management 
of owned firms, and discipline incumbent managers.
8
 In contrast, corporate directors could have an 
incentive to enjoy the private benefits of control that often harm bondholders. As a result, corporate 
directors are also likely to bring benefits or costs to bondholders. To address this, we also use 
Corporate director that is defined as the fraction of directors previously appointed by corporate 
shareholders as director members to the board. If activities by corporate shareholder are beneficial for 
bondholders, the coefficients on both Corporate ownership and Corporate director are expected to be 
negative. In contrast, if activities by corporate shareholder are costly for bondholders, the coefficients 
on both Corporate ownership and Corporate director are expected to be positive. Yet again, it is not 
possible to predict a priori which effect will dominate, and thus the effect of corporate shareholders on 
yield spreads is an empirical question. Data on corporate ownership are obtained from the Japan 
                                                   
8
 See, e.g., Kaplan and Minton (1994). 
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Company Handbook, and identification of directors previously appointed by corporate shareholders 
comes from the Yakuin Shikiho.  
 
2.3. Control variables 
 
In examining the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and the costs of public 
debt financing, we use three variable categories as control variables: governance-related variables, 
bond characteristics, and firm characteristics. 
 
2.3.1. Governance-related variables 
 
In addition to our main three corporate governance variables, we use the years of CEO tenure, 
the fraction of outside directors on the board, the size of board as control variables. These help control 
for other governance characteristics that could potentially affect the costs of public debt financing. 
CEO tenure length is associated with managerial opportunism by the CEO because the CEO’s control 
over management increases with the length of CEO tenure. In addition, the CEO could become more 
entrenched despite a relatively lower level of ownership by virtue of tenure length. CEO tenure is the 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the tenure length is more than ten years, and 0 otherwise.   
Outside directors also play an important role in monitoring managers, and then curbing their 
self-interested activities. Moreover, outside directors have the ability to oversee the financial 
accounting process, and as a result financial statement fraud is less prevalent in firms with outside 
directors (Anderson et al., 2004). Thus, these firms with such directors could enjoy lower costs of 
public debt financing. This is measured by the proportion of outside directors on the board (Outside 
director).
9
  
The number of board members could be related to the effectiveness of corporate governance 
because board size plays an essential role in monitoring and controlling managers. A smaller board 
could make decisions more quickly, and this effectively decrease any agency problems among boards. 
Indeed, Yermack (1996) finds negative relation between firm value and board size. On the other hand, 
a larger board also has some benefits in that the allocation of workload is across a great number of 
directors that in turn could commit greater efforts in overseeing management. As a result, monitoring 
activities become more frequent in larger boards (Anderson et al., 2004). This is measured as the 
number of the directors on the board (Board size). Identification of members of director boards comes 
                                                   
9
 In the calculation of board members, we do not include audit committee members. 
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from the Yakuin Shikiho.
10
 All of these corporate governance-related variables correspond to the fiscal 
year-end preceding the bond issue. 
 
2.3.2. Bond characteristics 
 
To control for other factors that could potentially affect the costs of public debt financing, we 
also need to include variables for the bond characteristics. Our equations include the variables for 
amount, maturity period, time of issue, and credit rating. An increase in leverage makes the bond 
riskier, which results in higher yield spreads. Amount (Amount) is measured by the natural logarithm 
of issue size (in billions of yen). Bond issues with longer maturities have higher risk and 
correspondingly have higher default risk. This leads to higher yield spreads. Maturity period 
(Maturity) is measured by the number of years to maturity. Firms with extensive experience in 
accessing the debt market are familiar with bondholders, and these firms could correspondingly enjoy 
lower yield spreads. This is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of times the firm has 
previously issued bonds (Times).  
In our sample of bond issues, each issue has credit ratings assigned by at least one of the four 
credit rating agencies: Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s, Japan Credit Rating Agency (JCR), and 
Rating & Investment Information (R&I). Problematically, bond issues usually have multiple credit 
ratings. To address this, we convert the credit rating into a numerical index, and calculate an average 
credit ratings score (Anderson et al., 2003; Klock et al., 2005; Ortiz-Molina, 2006). Table 1 presents 
the conversion numbers for S&P, Moody’s, JCR, and R&I firm bond ratings. For example, a firm with 
an A－ rating from S&P and an A＋ rating from R&I are assigned to an average score of 14. 
However, credit rating agencies are concerned about governance structure in evaluating the firm’s 
creditworthiness. The effect of corporate governance on default risk could be generally reflected on 
credit ratings. Indeed, previous papers find significant relation between corporate governance and 
credit rating (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). Accordingly, we regress an 
average credit rating score on our corporate governance variables, and then compute the residual from 
the regression. This residual thus contains information about creditworthiness excluding the effects of 
the corporate governance mechanisms on credit ratings. We use this residual as the variable for credit 
rating (Credit rating). Higher credit rating score generates lower yield spreads. 
 
2.3.3. Firm characteristics 
                                                   
10
 After the asset price bubbles in the early 1990s in Japan, board meetings in Japanese firms drastically 
changed. The focus of the reform is on outside directors and board member size (Nitta, 2008). Thus, 
controlling for different board characteristics resulting from board reform is important for our analyses. 
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To control for firm characteristics, we use the variables for profitability, immediate financial 
distress, leverage, growth opportunities, size, age, and dividend policy. Less profitable firms tend to 
have difficulty in repaying debt. These firms typically experience higher costs of public debt financing. 
Firm’s profitability (ROA) is defined as the ratio of pretax income to total assets. Lower working 
capital indicates that the firms are under intermediate financial stress. Such firms face higher costs of 
public debt financing. More importantly, corporate shareholders continue to maintain long-term 
relationship with owned firms through repeated business transactions. By controlling trade payables to 
owned firms or trade receivables from owned firms, corporate shareholders could help bail out the 
poorly performing owned firms. Thus, inclusion of working capital in our equation helps capture these 
effects on the costs of public debt financing. This is measured by the current assets minus current 
liabilities, divided by total assets (Working capital). Firms with larger leverage increase the probability 
of bankruptcy, thereby facing higher costs of public debt financing. Firm’s leverage (Leverage) is 
defined as the long-term debt, including long-term loans and bonds (straight, convertible, and warrant 
bonds), divided by total assets. Firms with higher growth opportunities could be also subject to greater 
risk, and then have higher costs of public debt financing. We define growth opportunities 
(Market-to-book ratio) as the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of total debt, 
divided by the book value of total assets. Larger firms generally enjoy the economies of scale, and 
stable performance. Thus, larger firms could enjoy lower costs of public debt financing. As firm’s size 
is not expected to be linearly associated with the costs of public debt financing, this is measured as the 
natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size) (in millions of yen). Older firms survive competitively in 
the market over longer periods, and thereby establish a reputation as creditworthy firms. Thus, older 
firms could have lower costs of public debt financing. Specifically, among family firms, firms in 
which the firm founder is on the board or is a major shareholder are younger. This shows that 
characteristics of family firms are closely related to firm’s age. Thus, inclusion of the variable for 
firm’s age in our specification is important in examining our predictions. We also expect the 
chronological firm age to nonlinearly affect the costs of public debt financing, and so this is measured 
by the natural logarithm of years elapsed since establishment (Firm age) (in years). Finally, 
bondholders are concerned about wealth transfer from bondholders to shareholders through dividend 
payments. If firm’s dividend policy is viewed as a form of wealth transfer by bondholders, dividend 
policy generates higher costs of public debt financing. In contrast, firm’s dividend policy could be a 
signal that the firm has substantial internal funds, and thus has lower default risk. If firm’s dividend 
policy is viewed favorably by bondholders, such a policy is negatively associated with the costs of 
public debt financing. To control for these effects, we use Dividend that is defined as total dividends, 
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divided by total sales. All of these firm-specific variables are measured at the fiscal year-end preceding 
the bond issue. Data on financial statement used for the calculation of these variables come from the 
Nikkei Needs dataset, which provides information on balance sheet and financial statement for the 
firms listed on the stock exchange.  
 
2.4. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the bond characteristics, corporate governance 
measures, and firm characteristics. The descriptive statistics include the means, medians, standard 
deviations, maximums, and minimums for the variables used in the basic analysis. Spread has a mean 
of 44.370 basis points, with a standard deviation of 32.411.
11
 CEO ownership has a mean value of 
0.007, with a standard deviation of 0.041. Family-owned firms comprise only about 8% of our sample. 
This suggests that family firms mainly use other methods for raising funds. Corporate ownership has a 
mean value of 0.054, a standard deviation of 0.136, a maximum value of 0.672, and minimum value of 
0, respectively. The mean value of Maturity is 6.257 years, with a standard deviation of 2.501 years. 
Credit rating has a mean value of 13.888, with a standard deviation of 1.965.
12
 The mean value of 
ROA is 0.022, with a standard deviation of 0.179. Firm size, the natural log of total assets, has a mean 
value of ¥14.066 million, a standard deviation of ¥1.152 million, a maximum value of ¥17.295 million, 
and minimum value of ¥10.561 million, respectively. 
Table 3 shows the distribution of the 640 firm-year observations on the 196 firms during the 
period 2005-2008. Panel A presents the distribution of the sample by fiscal year, while Panel B 
provides the industry distribution. The industry classifications come from the Japan Company 
Handbook.  
Table 4 reports the correlations between Spread, and the corporate governance variables, 
including CEO ownership, Family ownership, Corporate ownership, CEO tenure, Outside director, 
and Board size. Spread is positively correlated with CEO ownership, and Family ownership. This is 
consistent with the notion that bondholders are concerned about the agency conflicts with the CEO or 
family members that could enjoy the private benefits of control. Conversely, we find no significant 
relation between Spread and Corporate ownership. However, we do not control for other factors that 
could potentially affect Spread. To better explore the relation between Spread and Corporate 
                                                   
11
 In the subsequent empirical analysis, the yield spreads used are the raw values, not in basis points. 
12
 For the credit rating variable in Table 2, we use the residual from regressions of an average credit rating 
score on CEO ownership, family ownership, corporate ownership, outside director, and board size. CEO 
tenure is not used as an independent variable in the regression because it is highly correlated with CEO 
ownership, and so the effect of CEO tenure on credit rating is likely to be captured in CEO ownership. In 
the subsequent analysis, we use different corporate governance variables across different specifications, and 
correspondingly we reestimate a credit rating variable for each specification. 
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ownership, we need to use multivariate regression frameworks.  
 
3. Results 
 
In this section, we use multivariate frameworks to explore the relation between governance 
mechanisms and the costs of public debt financing. To draw meaningful inferences, we control for other 
governance-related factors, bond characteristics, and firm characteristics that could potentially affect the 
costs of public debt financing. We also include industry- and year-specific variables to control for any 
possible industry and year effects. Table 5 presents the results for the impacts of corporate governance 
measures on the costs of public debt financing during the period 2005-2008. The coefficients are 
estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression method. Standard errors reported in 
parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and adjusted for the clustering of multiple observations for 
the same firm.
13
 
Column 1 in Table 5 contains regression estimates for the specification with CEO ownership. 
The estimated coefficient on CEO ownership is statistically significant and positive. This suggests that 
firms in which the CEO dominates have higher costs of public debt financing, consistent with the 
notion that bondholders  demand higher yields from the firms with higher CEO ownership because of 
the concerns about the potential default risk arising from potential conflict of interests.                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Column 2 contains the results for the specification including Family ownership. The estimated 
coefficient on Family ownership is statistically significant and positive, suggesting that family firms 
experience higher costs of public debt financing. This is in line with the view that bondholders require 
higher yields from the firms in which conflict of interests between family members and bondholders 
potentially arises. This result runs contrary to the finding that firms with family ownership enjoy lower 
costs of public debt financing in the United States (Anderson et al., 2003). The contrasting results 
show that bondholders have different views about family-owned firms in different countries. 
Column 3 is based on the specification with Corporate ownership. The estimated coefficient on 
Corporate ownership is statistically significant and negative, suggesting that the costs of public debt 
financing are lower in firms with large corporate shareholders. This concurs with the notion that 
monitoring activities by large corporate shareholders serve as an effective mechanism for better 
protecting the interests of bondholders.
14
 
Column 4 considers the basic specification in which we simultaneously consider all three 
                                                   
13
 For the clustering technique, see, e.g., Wooldridge (2002). 
14
 Negative relation between corporate ownership and spread could interpreted as suggesting that parent 
firms as large shareholders explicitly or implicitly guarantee the credit for their subsidiaries or affiliated 
firms, and that such a credit guarantee is viewed favorably in the bond markets. 
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corporate governance variables. In line with our results in columns 1-3, the estimated coefficient on 
CEO ownership is statistically significant and positive, and the estimated coefficient on Family 
ownership is statistically significant and positive. The estimated coefficient on Corporate ownership is 
also statistically significant and negative.  
In terms of control variables, the estimated coefficient on CEO tenure is not statistically 
significant in two regressions because the effect of CEO tenure on Spread could be captured in CEO 
ownership. As Table 4 reports, the correlation coefficient between CEO tenure and CEO ownership is 
0.482.  The estimated coefficients on Outside director and Board size are not statistically significant. 
This could be because of collinearity among the governance variables. Amount has an estimated 
coefficient that is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that larger amounts of debt have 
higher default risk, resulting in higher costs of public debt financing. The estimated coefficient on 
Maturity is statistically significant and positive, suggesting that bonds with longer maturities have 
higher costs of public debt financing because of greater default risk. Times has a coefficient that is 
negative and statistically significant in two of the four regressions, indicating that firms that issue 
bonds frequently are viewed favorablely in the bond markets. The negative and statistically significant 
estimated coefficient on Credit rating indicates that a decrease in default risk lowers the costs of 
public debt financing. The estimated coefficient on ROA is statistically significant and negative, 
indicating that firms with better performance are viewed positively by bondholders. The significant 
negative estimated coefficient on Working capital indicates that firms under immediate financial stress 
face higher costs of public debt financing. The statistically significant and positive coefficient on 
Leverage indicates that firms with higher debt levels face higher costs of public debt financing 
because of higher default risk. Market-to-book ratio has no statistically significant coefficients in all 
four specifications, possibly because the effects are likely to be captured in Credit rating. Statistically 
significant and negative coefficients on Firm size and Firm age indicate that larger and older firms 
enjoy lower costs of public debt financing. Dividend has a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient. This could be interpreted as evidence that bondholders consider dividend policy as a signal 
that firms have rich source of internal funds.  
In Table 5, we explore the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and the costs of 
public debt financing. Our findings reveal that all three governance variables are significantly 
associated with yield spreads. We thus conclude that these governance measures have influential 
impacts on the costs of public debt financing, and that these impacts vary across alternative corporate 
governance systems. 
  
4. Additional results 
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In this section, we present additional results for the relation between corporate governance and 
the costs of public debt financing. First, to capture managerial incentives, Managerial ownership is 
included in our specification. Column 1 of Table 6 reports the results for the specification with 
Managerial ownership.
15
 Like CEO ownership, the estimated coefficient on Managerial ownership is 
statistically significant and positive. This suggests that firms with higher managerial ownership face 
higher costs of public debt financing, and corresponds with the view that bondholders are concerned 
about potential agency conflicts, and thus require higher yields when financing such firms. It is well 
documented that a nonlinear relation between managerial ownership and firm performance exists (see 
e.g., Morck et al., 1988). To capture this effect, we estimate the regression with a squared term of 
Managerial ownership as an additional variable. In unreported results, both the linear and squared 
terms of Managerial ownership have no significant coefficients. This could be attributed to 
multicollinearity between the linear and squared terms.
16
  
Next, family firm characteristics could have different impacts on the costs of public debt 
financing. To capture the effects of family firm characteristics on the costs of public debt financing, we 
use five family firm-related variables: Founder ownership, Founder management, Descendant 
ownership, Descendant management, and Outsider management. In unreported results, we find no 
significant relation between five family-related variables and yield spreads. This could be attributable 
to higher correlation of CEO ownership with Founder ownership. Indeed, the correlation coefficient 
between CEO ownership and Founder ownership is 0.766. Then, we examine the effects of these 
family firm-related variables on yield spreads by removing CEO ownership from our specification. 
Column 2 presents the results for the specification with five family firm-related variables. The 
estimated coefficient on Founder ownership is statistically significant and negative. This indicates that 
family firms in which the firm founder occupies a top management position, and family members are 
major shareholders face higher costs of public debt financing, suggesting that such family firms have 
more incentive to entrench themselves at the expense of bondholders. However, the remaining family 
firm-related variables have no significant coefficients, possible because of the smaller observations for 
these variables. 
Third, we focus attention on the directors previously appointed by corporate shareholders to the 
board. As we argued earlier, when corporate shareholders have an incentive to intervene in the 
management of owned firms, they tend to dispatch their employees as directors on the firm’s board. 
                                                   
15
 Bagnani et al. (1994) explore the linkage between managerial ownership and the return premia on 
corporate bonds. 
16
 Hiraki et al. (1998) find no nonlinear relation between managerial ownership and firm performance. 
However, unlike our findings, they document that managerial ownership is positively related to firm value 
over their sample period, ranging from the late 1980s to the late 1990s. 
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These appointed directors then help discipline managers to have their interests respected. Thus, the 
presence of corporate directors on board is a direct indicator that the involvement of corporate 
shareholders in management increases. Our variable, Corporate director, helps capture the impacts of 
corporate directors on the costs of public debt financing. Column 3 provides the results with 
Corporate director. The estimated coefficient on Corporate director is statistically significant and 
negative, suggesting that firms with directors from large corporate shareholders experience lower costs 
of public debt financing. This aligns the view that directors appointed by large corporate shareholders 
to the board discipline the incumbent managers, thereby reducing the agency conflicts with 
bondholders. 
Table 6 reports additional regression results for the relation between corporate governance 
mechanisms and the costs of public debt financing. We provide evidence that managerial ownership, 
family-firm related variables, and corporate director have essential impacts on the costs of public debt 
financing.  
 
5. Robustness checks 
 
Earlier sections present evidence that corporate governance mechanism in Japan exercises 
significant influence over the costs of public debt financing. In this section, we test whether our results 
are robust to various alternative specifications. Table 7 provides the regression estimates as robustness 
checks of our results. We only present the robustness tests of our results for the basic regression in 
Table 5, but our robustness checks also hold for the three specifications in Table 6. 
 
5.1 Security firms as underwriters 
 
Existing works extensively explore the role of commercial banks in underwriting securities, 
especially via bank subsidiary security firms.
17
 These papers propose two opposing views: the 
certification view and the conflict-of-interest view. According to the certification view, close 
relationships with banks brings benefits to client firms that issue bonds because commercial banks 
have an advantage over security firms in gathering firm’s private information unavailable to other 
security firms and investors through loan contracts and other financial services. When bank-owned 
security firms underwrite the securities of firms that establish close relationship with banks, banks 
then have the ability to provide greater certification to the value of the issue. Investors reflect this 
certification by banks in bond yields, and demand lower yields on the issues underwritten by bank 
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 For empirical analyses on the role of Japanese banks in bond underwriting, see Hamao and Hoshi (2000), 
Kang and Liu (2007), and Konishi (2002). 
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subsidiary security firms. Thus, we expect issues underwritten by bank subsidiary security firms to 
have lower yields than those underwritten by other security firms. In contrast, in the view of the 
conflict-of-interest, strong bank-firm relationship develops conflict of interests between banks and 
investors. Banks could exercise significant influence over their client firms, and so often require client 
firms to issue bonds to repay bank loans. In particular, such bank incentives become stronger when the 
client firms are under financial distress. In this situation, bank-owned security firms underwrite bonds 
issued by poorly performing firms, and entice potential investors by lowering the prices of these bonds. 
This indicates that default risk is transferred from banks to investors, thereby resulting in the 
divergence of interests between banks and investors. When investors forecast this incentive, they 
reflect the wealth transfer in bond yields, and demand higher yields on the issues underwritten by 
bank-owned security firms. In summary, we predict that issues underwritten by bank-owned security 
firms have higher yields than those underwritten by other security firms. Overall, the effect of the 
bank-firm relationship on bond yields is an empirical question. In our analysis, if bank-owned security 
firms are among the lead managers of underwriters, we denote the issue as underwritten by 
bank-owned security firms. We then construct a dummy variable (Bank underwriting) that takes a 
value of 1 if the issue is classified as underwritten by bank-owned security firm, and 0 otherwise. Of 
the 640 bond issues in our sample, there are 234 issues on 111 firms underwritten by bank-owned 
security firms. Column 1 provides the regression estimates including Bank underwriting. Consistent 
with the findings in Hamao and Hoshi (2000), the estimated coefficient on Bank underwriting is 
negative, but not statistically significant. However, our results concerning corporate governance 
variables remain significant, even after controlling for the difference between underwriters.  
 
5.2 Financial institution ownership 
 
The bank-firm relationship is also closely associated with the firm’s public debt financing. Datta 
et al. (1999) show that the bank-firm relationship (as measured by the presence of bank loans as a 
certification of creditworthiness) significantly lowers the at-issue yield spread for new public debt.
18
 
Along with bank debt, equity ownership by banks then also plays a role in establishing the bank-firm 
relationship in Japan. Accordingly, we use the proportion of equity held by financial institutions 
(Financial institution ownership) to control for this relationship. If this variable helps capture the 
effect of the bank-firm relationship, firms with ties to financial institutions as shareholders have lower 
yield spreads. On the other hand, earlier works document that financial institutions as shareholders 
                                                   
18
 The variable, leverage, includes long-term loans from financial institutions, mainly banks. Given that 
long-term loans are closely associated with bank-firm relationship, we already control for the effect of 
bank-firm relationship through bank debt on yield spreads. 
- 18 - 
 
could play less role in corporate governance (see, e.g., Miyajima and Kuroki, 2007). If this is the case, 
bondholders will require higher yields for firms with such ineffective governance systems. In column 
2, we present the results for the specification with Financial institution ownership. The estimated 
coefficient on Financial institution ownership is negative, but not statistically significant. However, 
inclusion of Financial institution ownership does not affect our basic results for the relation between 
our corporate governance variables and yield spreads. 
 
5.3 Sample selection 
 
Our results are susceptible to sample selection concerns because our sample is restricted to firms 
that issued only straight bonds to raise funds during the sample period. The results from this 
nonrandomly selected sample could then face a self-selection problem that biases the estimated 
coefficients. To correct for any possible bias, we reestimate the regression coefficients, using 
Heckman’s two-step approach (Heckman, 1979). In the first-stage probit regression, we analyse debt 
issue choice using an additional sample of 1532 publicly-traded firms, with fiscal years ending in 
March, that did not issue straight bonds at least during the sample period. The independent variables in 
the regression includes ROA, financial institution ownership, working capital, cash holding (the ratio 
of cash and short securities to total assets), leverage, market-to book ratio, firm size, and firm age. In 
the second-stage, the inverse Mills ratio estimated from the probit regression is included in our 
specification, and we estimate the equation using OLS regression. Column 3 report the regression 
results with the inverse Mills ratio as the sample selection adjustment term. The estimated coefficient 
on Inverse Mills ratio is positive, but not statistically significant. Thus, our results remain stable, even 
after controlling for the sample selection term. 
 
5.4 Nonlinearities in credit rating and leverage 
 
We estimate regression models allowing for the nonlinear effects of Leverage and Credit rating 
on Spread. Column 4 of Table 7 shows the results with the specification including the squared term of 
Leverage (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒2) (Anderson et al., 2003; Klock et al., 2005). The estimated coefficient on 
Leverage is negative, but not statistically significant, while 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒2 have a statistically significant 
and positive coefficient. Adding the squared term of Leverage to the equation does not affect our 
results. Column 5 contains the results for the specification with the squared term of Credit rating 
(𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔2) (Anderson et al., 2003; Klock et al., 2005; Ortiz-Molina, 2006). The estimated 
coefficient on Credit rating is statistically significant and negative, and the estimated coefficient on 
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𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔2 is statistically significant and positive. This indicates that credit rating scores are 
nonlinearly associated with yield spreads. For corporate governance variables, this regression also 
yields similar results to those in Table 5. Taken together, our results are robust to alternative 
specifications with respect to nonlinearities in Leverage and Credit rating. 
 
5.5 Adjusting credit rating score 
 
In Table 1, we assign the same conversion numbers to each credit rating level from the four 
credit rating agencies. However, it is well known that Japanese firms typically receive lower credit 
ratings from foreign credit rating agencies (S&P and Moody’s) than from domestic credit rating 
agencies (JCR and R&I). Indeed, we find that for 104 issues on 23 firms with credit ratings from both 
foreign and domestic agencies in our sample, an average credit rating score by foreign agencies is 
lower than by domestic agencies, and the differences are statistically significant. To adjust for this 
difference, when we add a value of 1.5 to each conversion number of foreign agencies in Table 1, the 
difference between average credit rating scores by foreign agencies and domestic agencies is not 
statistically significant.
19
 Using the adjusted conversion numbers applied to all credit ratings from 
foreign agencies, we estimate the variable for adjusted credit rating (Adjusted credit rating). Column 6 
reports the regression estimates for the specification with Adjusted credit rating. Adjusted credit rating 
has a coefficient that is negative and statistically significant. Nevertheless, for our corporate 
governance variables, this specification yields similar results to those in Table 5. 
 
5.6 Endogeneity concerns 
 
One concern about our results is that the relation between corporate governance variables and 
yield spreads is subject to potential endogeneity problems. Thus, we need to check whether our 
corporate governance variables are endogenous. In the test for endogeneity (Wooldridge’s 
regression-based test), we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all the corporate governance variables 
under consideration are exogenous at conventional significant levels.
20
 This suggests that our results 
in Table 5 will not be biased. Overall, this test confirms the view that our results are less susceptible to 
endogeneity concerns, and thus provide confidence in our evidence that our corporate governance 
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 For example, a firm with an A－ rating from S&P and an A＋ rating from R&I receive an average 
value of 14.75. 
20 The relation between corporate governance and yield spreads could be less subject to 
endogeneity problems because changes in corporate governance will be reflected in bond yields 
immediately, but it is unlikely that changes in bond yields affect corporate governance quickly (Klock, et 
al., 2005). 
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variables are significantly related to the costs of public debt financing. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we empirically test the relation between corporate governance mechanisms in 
Japan and the costs of public debt financing. In particular, our analyses evaluate competing hypotheses 
about the impact of corporate governance on the costs of public debt financing, with special attention 
to three mechanisms: CEO ownership, family ownership, and corporate ownership. The overall 
conclusion is that corporate governance structures in Japan significantly influence the costs of public 
debt financing.  
Using a sample of Japanese straight corporate bonds during the period 2005-2008, we find that 
CEO ownership is positively correlated with yield spreads after controlling for firm- and 
bond-characteristics. This suggests that firms in which the CEO dominates have higher costs of public 
debt financing because of the potential agency problem with bondholders. In addition, family 
ownership is also positively associated with yield spreads, suggesting that bondholders are concerned 
about agency conflicts with family firms, and so family firms experience higher costs of public debt 
financing. Third, corporate ownership is related to lower yield spreads. This indicates that firms with 
effective governance mechanisms are rewarded with lower yields. 
In addition, we provide several additional results. First, managerial ownership is associated with 
higher yield spreads. Second, among family firms, family firms in which the firm founder occupies a 
top director position, and family members are major shareholders face higher yield spreads. Finally, a 
higher proportion of directors from corporate shareholders is related to lower yield spreads. To check 
the robustness of our results, we test various regression models. Our results are robust to alternative 
specifications with respect to the types of security firms serving as bond underwriters, inclusion of 
financial institution ownership, sample selection concerns, nonlinearities in credit rating and leverage, 
adjusted credit rating variable, and endogeneity concerns. 
Consequently, we provide strong evidence that corporate governance systems in Japan 
significantly affect the costs of public debt financing. This paper contributes to the existing literatures 
on the determinants of at-issue bond yields by showing that corporate governance systems in Japan are 
significantly associated with the costs of public debt financing, and then these costs vary with the 
characteristics of corporate governance systems. 
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Table 1. Credit rating numerical conversions 
 
Notes: This table presents the credit rating conversion codes for the S&P, Moody’s, JCR, and R&I used in the analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conversion no. S&P Moody’s JCR R&I
19 AAA Aaa AAA AAA
18 AA+ Aa1 AA+ AA+
17 AA Aa2 AA AA
16 AA－ Aa3 AA－ AA－
15 A+ A1 A+ A+
14 A A2 A A
13 A－ A3 A－ A－
12 BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ BBB+
11 BBB Baa2 BBB BBB
10 BBB－ Baa3 BBB－ BBB－
9 BB+ Ba1 BB+ BB+
8 BB Ba2 BB BB
7 BB－ Ba3 BB－ BB－
6 B+ B1 B+ B+
5 B B2 B B
4 B－ B3 B－ B－
3 CCC Caa CCC CCC
2 CC Ca CC CC
1 C C C C
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of bond characteristics, governance measures, and firm characteristics 
 
Notes: This table presents summary statistics－means, medians, standard deviations, maximums, and minimums－
for the variables used in the analysis. The sample comprises 640 firm-year observations on 196 firms during the 
period 2005-2008. 
 
 
 
 
Variables Mean Median Std.dev. Maximum Minimum
(a)  Bond characteristics
Spread (basis points) 44.370 36.600 32.411 267.400 0.800
Amount 4.988 4.605 0.608 7.601 3.401
Maturity (years) 6.258 5.000 2.501 20.000 3.000
Times 2.746 2.970 1.130 4.543 0.000
Credit rating 13.888 14.000 1.956 18.333 9.000
(b) Governance measures
CEO ownership 0.007 0.000 0.041 0.338 0.000
Managerial ownership 0.010 0.000 0.046 0.505 0.000
Family ownership 0.078 0.000 0.268 1.000 0.000
Founder ownership 0.041 0.000 0.197 1.000 0.000
Founder management 0.005 0.000 0.068 1.000 0.000
Descendant ownership 0.023 0.000 0.151 1.000 0.000
Descendant management 0.028 0.000 0.165 1.000 0.000
Outsider management 0.014 0.000 0.118 1.000 0.000
Corporate ownership 0.054 0.000 0.136 0.672 0.000
Corporate director 0.050 0.000 0.134 0.923 0.000
CEO tenure 0.066 0.000 0.248 1.000 0.000
Outside director 0.134 0.100 0.149 0.800 0.000
Board size 12.075 11.000 4.156 31.000 5.000
(c) Firm characteristics
ROA 0.022 0.029 0.179 0.282 －1.779
Working capital 0.020 0.008 0.059 0.235 －0.184
Leverage 0.215 0.201 0.113 0.499 0.000
Market-to-book ratio 1.221 1.170 0.376 4.360 0.167
Firm size 14.066 14.190 1.152 17.295 10.561
Firm age 4.001 4.127 0.796 4.828 0.693
Dividend 0.052 0.014 0.152 1.254 0.000
- 26 - 
 
Table 3. Year and industry distribution of the sample 
 
Notes: This table shows the distribution of 640 firm-year observations on 196 firms during the period 2005-2008. Panel A presents the 
fiscal year distribution of the sample, and Panel B shows the industry distribution of the sample. Industry classifications come from the 
Japan Company Handbook.
Year No. of firms No. of firm-year observations
2005 80 138
2006 83 156
2007 111 206
2008 70 140
Industry No. of firms No. of firm-year observations
Construction 5 11
Foods 14 37
Texitles 3 6
Pulp and paper 4 14
Chemicals 16 43
Drug and medicine 1 3
Oil and coal 3 10
Rubber 4 9
Glass and ceramics 6 15
Iron and steel 7 46
Nonferrous metals 7 22
Metal products 2 2
General machinery 10 28
Electronic equipment 22 61
Transport equipment 13 33
Precision equipment 3 7
Other products 5 6
Land transportation 17 72
Marine transportation 3 7
Air transportation 1 5
Warehouse 3 7
Information and communication 9 33
Wholesale 8 70
Retail 10 14
Real estate 17 73
Service 3 6
Panel A. Year distribution
Panel B. Industry distribution
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Table 4. Correlation coefficients between yield spreads and corporate governance variables 
Variables Spread CEO ownership Family ownership Corporate ownership CEO tenure Outside director
CEO ownership 0.501
(0.000)
Family ownership 0.352 0.589
(0.000) (0.000)
Corporate ownership －0.024 －0.050 －0.066
(0.544) (0.211) (0.094)
CEO tenure 0.235 0.482 0.464 －0.059
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.134)
Outside director 0.095 0.052 0.084 －0.028 －0.071
(0.017) (0.189) (0.034) (0.488) (0.074)
Board size －0.157 －0.157 －0.203 －0.069 －0.154 －0.148
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.080) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: This table provides the correlation coefficients between variables including spread, CEO ownership, family ownership, corporate ownership, CEO tenure, outside 
director, and board size. The sample covers 640 firm-year observations on 196 firms during the period 2005-2008. Significance level is provided in parentheses below each 
coefficient. 
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Table 5. Corporate governance and yield spreads 
Variables 1 2 3 4
CEO ownership 3.677*** 3.117****
(0.361) (0.367)
CEO tenure 0.007 －0.025
(0.049) (0.052)
Family ownership 0.436*** 0.162**
(0.104) (0.080)
Corporate ownership －0.483*** －0.211**
(0.126) (0.090)
Outside director 0.031 －0.004 0.012 0.015
(0.096) (0.101) (0.110) (0.093)
Board size 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Amount 0.039* 0.047** 0.061** 0.041***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.025) (0.021)
Maturity 0.008*** 0.006** 0.008** 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Times －0.033* －0.017 －0.019 －0.029*
(0.017) (0.020) (0.023) (0.017)
Credit rating －0.067*** －0.071*** －0.067*** －0.064***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
ROA －0.465*** －0.489*** －0.423*** －0.459***
(0.061) (0.061) (0.070) (0.055)
Working capital －0.541* －0.647** －0.952*** －0.530*
(0.310) (0.301) (0.329) (0.286)
Leverage 0.267** 0.405** 0.464** 0.281**
(0.126) (0.164) (0.189) (0.122)
Market-to-book ratio －0.004 0.014 0.040 －0.023
(0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048)
Firm size －0.040** －0.042* －0.091*** －0.041**
(0.019) (0.023) (0.030) (0.018)
Firm age －0.062*** －0.086*** －0.091*** －0.070***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.023)
Dividend －0.262*** －0.366*** －0.429*** －0.289***
(0.080) (0.076) (0.091) (0.069)
R 2 0.678 0.636 0.607 0.685
No. of observations 640 640 640 640
Notes: This table reports the regression results for 640 straight corporate bond issues during the period 2005-2008. 
Coefficients are estimated using ordinary least squares. All equations include industry- and year-specific variables. 
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity, and adjusted for firm clustering. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6. Corporate governance and yield spreads: additional results 
 
Variables 1 2 3
CEO ownership 3.143***
(0.368)
Managerial ownership 2.611***
(0.573)
CEO tenure －0.016 －0.027
(0.050) (0.052)
Family ownership 0.163* 0.165**
(0.090) (0.081)
Founder ownership 0.762***
(0.121)
Founder management －0.192
(0.166)
Descendant ownership 0.073
(0.073)
Descendant management 0.075
(0.073)
Outsider management 0.011
(0.109)
Corporate ownership －0.220** －0.244***
(0.090) (0.089)
Corporate director －0.228***
(0.084)
Outside director 0.045 －0.011 0.008
(0.098) (0.090) (0.093)
Board size 0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Amount 0.043** 0.049** 0.040*
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Maturity 0.007** 0.009*** 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Times －0.025 －0.028 －0.028
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Credit rating －0.064*** －0.066*** －0.064***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
ROA －0.465** －0.499*** －0.466***
(0.056) (0.051) (0.055)
Working capital －0.548* －0.446 －0.503*
(0.289) (0.291) (0.292)
Leverage 0.305** 0.340*** 0.280**
(0.130) (0.128) (0.123)
Market-to-book ratio －0.017 0.049 －0.022
(0.048) (0.055) (0.049)
Firm size －0.043** －0.032* －0.039**
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Firm age －0.073*** －0.077*** －0.068***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Dividend －0.295*** －0.415*** －0.279***
(0.065) (0.111) (0.068)
R 2 0.676 0.683 0.684
No. of observations 640 640 640  
Notes: This table reports the regression results for 640 straight corporate bond issues during the period 2005-2008. Coefficients are 
estimated using ordinary least squares. All equations include industry- and year-specific variables. Standard errors in parentheses are robust 
to heteroskedasticity, and adjusted for firm clustering. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table7. Corporate governance and yield spreads: robustness checks 
Notes: This table reports the regression results for 640 straight corporate bond issues during the period 2005-2008. Coefficients are estimated using ordinary least squares. 
All equations include industry- and year-specific variables. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity, and adjusted for firm clustering. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6
CEO ownership 3.130*** 2.988*** 3.112*** 3.028*** 3.250*** 3.140***
(0.369) (0.361) (0.362) (0.360) (0.358) (0.372)
CEO tenure －0.027 －0.023 －0.027 －0.022 －0.004 －0.026
(0.052) (0.051) (0.053) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Family ownership 0.161** 0.159* 0.161** 0.158* 0.162** 0.171**
(0.080) (0.082) (0.081) (0.080) (0.071) (0.081)
Corporate ownership －0.208** －0.273*** －0.213** －0.221** －0.253*** －0.210**
(0.090) (0.103) (0.092) (0.092) (0.081) (0.092)
Financial institution ownership －0.135
(0.163)
Outside director 0.014 －0.009 0.013 0.030 0.066 0.001
(0.093) (0.100) (0.093) (0.090) (0.086) (0.094)
Board size 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Amount 0.042* 0.042** 0.041* 0.035* 0.025 0.042**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Maturity 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.008*** 0.007** 0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Times －0.029 －0.031* －0.028 －0.023 －0.024 －0.028
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018)
Credit rating －0.064*** －0.065*** －0.064*** －0.061*** －0.515***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.087)
Credit rating2 0.018***
(0.003)
Adjusted credit rating －0.062***
(0.009)
ROA －0.459*** －0.470*** －0.461*** －0.434*** －0.377*** －0.459***
(0.054) (0.052) (0.059) (0.054) (0.058) (0.054)
Working capital －0.539* －0.533* －0.543* －0.508* －0.429 －0.512*
(0.284) (0.286) (0.292) (0.276) (0.280) (0.282)
Leverage 0.281** 0.291** 0.289** －0.477 0.274** 0.261**
(0.121) (0.123) (0.146) (0.331) (0.112) (0.127)
Leverage2 1.077**
(0.464)
Market-to-book ratio －0.024 －0.023 －0.027 －0.029 －0.054 －0.021
(0.048) (0.048) (0.060) (0.048) (0.043) (0.047)
Firm size －0.042** －0.039** －0.037 －0.045** －0.043** －0.036*
(0.019) (0.018) (0.032) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019)
Firm age －0.070*** －0.071*** －0.071*** －0.072*** －0.051** －0.073***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Dividend －0.287*** －0.291*** －0.288*** －0.329*** －0.228*** －0.268***
(0.069) (0.071) (0.069) (0.068) (0.061) (0.071)
Bank underwriting －0.010
(0.020)
Inverse mills ratio 0.008
(0.063)
R 2 0.685 0.685 0.685 0.691 0.716 0.684
No. of observations 640 640 640 640 640 640
